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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, a jury found Dan Ray Nelson guilty of sexual battery of a minor
child sixteen or seventeen years old. Mr. Nelson appealed, asserting his right to a fair
trial, guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions, had been violated
because of the prosecutor’s misconduct.

Specifically, Mr. Nelson asserted the

prosecutor struck multiple “foul blows” during closing argument by impermissibly
vouching for the investigating officer and the prosecutor and by appealing to the
emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury, and this prosecutorial misconduct amounted to
fundamental error.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State contended Mr. Nelson did not show
fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing argument, because the prosecutor did not
commit impermissible vouching or appeal to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the
jury. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-11.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s
arguments, which are unavailing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Nelson’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the State violate Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial by committing multiple
acts of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument?
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ARGUMENT
The State Violated Mr. Nelson’s Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By Committing
Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument
A.

Introduction
Mr. Nelson asserts the State violated his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument.

Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct during

closing argument by vouching for the credibility of the investigating officer and the
prosecutor and by appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. These
prosecutorial “foul blows” committed during closing arguments amounted to
fundamental error and this Court should vacate Mr. Nelson’s conviction in light of
the misconduct.
B.

Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Violated Mr. Nelson’s
Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial
Misconduct During Closing Argument
Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct, in violation of

Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial, by vouching for the credibility of the
investigating officer and the prosecutor and by appealing to the emotion, passion or
prejudice of the jury.

The error plainly existed, and the misconduct prejudiced

Mr. Nelson. Thus, fundamental error occurred in this case. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227 (2010); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 22 (Ct. App. 2008).
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The State argues Mr. Nelson has not shown fundamental error in the
prosecutor’s closing argument.

(See Resp. Br., pp.4-11.)

The State’s arguments

are unavailing.
The first prong of fundamental error review here asks whether the prosecutor
violated Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial by committing misconduct. See
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226-27. Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct
by vouching for the credibility of the investigating officer and the prosecutor and by
appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury.
1.

Vouching For The Credibility Of The Investigating Officer
Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the

credibility of the investigating officer.

Specifically, the prosecutor vouched for the

credibility of Detective John Marley by expressing a personal belief as to the credibility
of Detective Marley that was not based on inferences from evidence presented at trial.
The prosecutor urged the jury to believe Detective Marley not because of the evidence
presented at trial, but “because the absurdity to suggest Detective Marley would lie
about this makes my skin crawl.” (See Tr., p.493, Ls.5-8.) The prosecutor expressed
his personal belief as to the credibility of Detective Marley, and that personal belief was
based not on inferences from evidence presented on trial but on the prosecutor’s own
visceral reaction. See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 481-82 (2012).
The State contends the prosecutor’s argument was proper, because there was
nothing in the argument “suggesting it was based on anything other than the evidence.”
(Resp. Br., p.7.)

However, the State ignores the distinction the prosecutor drew

between his attempt to walk through the interview “very objectively,” i.e., based on the
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evidence presented at trial, and the prosecutor’s own subjective response, namely that
“the absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin
crawl.” (See Tr., p.493, Ls.1-8.) Thus, the prosecutor expressed that his personal
belief as to the credibility of Detective Marley was based not on inferences from
evidence presented on trial but on the prosecutor’s own visceral reaction.

See

Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 481-82.

See

Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct.

Gross, 146 Idaho at 19-20.
2.

Vouching For The Prosecutor And The Investigating Officer
Mr. Nelson further asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for

himself and the investigating officer. Specifically, the prosecutor’s comments on how
“we can do a better job” in coming up with a lie aligned Detective Marley with the
prosecutor and emphasized the prosecutor and the witness were working together on
the same team.

The prosecutor argued both he and the investigating officer were

capable of telling “better” lies, and therefore the jury should believe the account of the
prosecutor and Detective Marley. (See Tr., p.494, L.13 – p.495, L.1.) By aligning the
witness with the prosecutor, the prosecutor’s comments on being capable of telling a
better lie argued that the jury should believe the prosecutor and Detective Marley
because they were representatives of the State, inducing the jury “to trust the
Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.” See United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985). Further, by declaring that he and the investigating
officer could do a better job in lying, the prosecutor expressly referred to facts not in
evidence. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20.
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The State argues that the prosecutor’s argument “was a proper argument for the
jury to apply its common sense and experience in evaluating whether Detective
Marley’s testimony regarding [Mr.] Nelson’s confession was a lie or the truth,” and that
“in context the ‘we’ used by the prosecutor is apparently a reference to the prosecutor
and the jurors being able to come up with a better lie than the detective allegedly did.”
(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) The State’s argument appears to be based on a misapprehension
of what the prosecutor actually said. The prosecutor’s comments did not happen in the
context of any reference to the jurors being able to come up with a better lie. Rather,
the prosecutor’s made the comments to the jury in the context of whether “[Detective]
Marley’s lying to you.” (See Tr., p.494, Ls.13-18.) The prosecutor argued: “Well, if he’s
lying to you—I don’t mean to sound terrible, but I can do a better job. I mean, if you
want me to lie to you, we can do a better job.

Okay?”

(Tr., p.494, Ls.18-21.)

Regarding Detective Marley, the prosecutor later argued, “[a]nd to suggest he’s lying
about something, when the lie could easily have been much better . . . .” (Tr., p.494,
L.25 – p.495, L.1.)
Thus, nothing in the context of the prosecutor’s comments suggests the
prosecutor was referring to the jurors being able to come up with a better lie. The
prosecutor’s comments that Detective Marley could do a better job lying and that the
prosecutor himself could do a better job lying (see Tr., p.494, L.13 – p.495, L.1), instead
indicate the prosecutor’s use of “we” was to align Detective Marley with the prosecutor
and emphasize the prosecutor and the witness were working together on the same
team. Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were misconduct. See Young, 470 U.S. at 1819; Gross, 146 Idaho at 20.
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3.

Appealing To The Emotion, Passion Or Prejudice Of The Jury
Additionally, Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by

appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. Specifically, the prosecutor
invited the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim. By inviting the jury to step
into the shoes of the alleged victim, C.F., at the time he reported the alleged offenses to
the forensic interviewer, the prosecutor urged the jury to find Mr. Nelson guilty based on
imagining themselves being placed in C.F.’s position and their resulting sympathy for
him.

See Commonwealth v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Pa. 1977);

Commonwealth v. Olmande, 995 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Mass. App. 2013); State v.
McDaniel, 462 S.E.2d 882, 883-84 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). Those comments improperly
appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of
inflammatory tactics. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21.
Relying on Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873 (1988), the State contends the
prosecutor’s argument, “made in relation to the victim’s credibility, was a proper
argument based on the jury’s common sense and life experiences, and not a call to
sympathize with the victim.” (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) However, Lopez does not justify the
prosecutor’s improper comments in this case.
Lopez was a civil case centering on whether the defendant was the owner of a
car for purposes of extending tort liability for a fatal accident under the theory of
negligent entrustment. Lopez, 114 Idaho at 874. The defendant, on the advice of his
attorney, had endorsed and delivered the title of the car to another party, but the other
party did not register the vehicle in her name after receiving the title. Id. at 874-75. In
closing argument, regarding the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions, defense
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counsel asked the jury to place themselves in the same position as the defendant with
respect to the alleged transfer of title. See id. at 878. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that such “golden rule” arguments are “only appropriate when used to ask the jury to
assess the reasonableness of a party’s actions by relying upon their own common
sense and life experiences.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the State confuses asking a jury, in a civil case, to assess the
reasonableness of a party’s actions, with inviting a jury, in a criminal case, to find a
witness credible and thus find the defendant guilty. Unlike the closing argument in
Lopez, the prosecutor’s comments in the instant case were directed not at the
reasonableness of C.F.’s actions, but at C.F.’s credibility. (See Tr., p.489, L.12 – p.490,
L.2.) Thus, Lopez, where the Court held “golden rule” arguments are “only appropriate
when used to ask the jury to assess the reasonableness of a party’s actions by relying
upon their own common sense and life experiences,” 114 Idaho at 878, does not justify
the prosecutor’s improper comments. The prosecutor’s comments were misconduct
because they improperly appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through the use of inflammatory tactics. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21.
Because the prosecutor’s comments vouched for the credibility of the prosecutor
and investigating officer and appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury by
asking the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim, the prosecutor
committed misconduct that violated Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial. As
demonstrated above, the State’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.1

The second prong of fundamental error review for prosecutorial misconduct asks
whether the error plainly exists, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to

1
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for sexual battery
of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years old and remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

object was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The State has not
specifically addressed whether the misconduct asserted by Mr. Nelson plainly existed.
(See Resp. Br., pp.4-11.) Thus, no further response on this point is necessary, and
Mr. Nelson would direct the Court’s attention to pages 18-19 of the Appellant’s Brief.
The third prong of fundamental error review asks whether the misconduct
prejudiced the defendant. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 228. The State has only
specifically addressed prejudice with respect to Mr. Nelson’s assertion the prosecutor
committed misconduct through appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the
jury by asking the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim. (See Resp.
Br., p.11 n.1.) The State’s argument on this point is largely unremarkable and generally
addressed in Mr. Nelson’s Appellant’s Brief. Thus, no further response is necessary,
and Mr. Nelson would direct the Court’s attention to pages 19-20 of the
Appellant’s Brief.
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
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